

Participatory Perspectives on Counselling Research

DAVID HILES

Department of Psychology, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK

“All knowing is personal knowing – participation through indwelling.”

Michael Polanyi (1975, p. 44)

Abstract

I want to explore the importance of establishing a direct link between the participatory nature of therapeutic practice and an expanding range of what I call *participatory* inquiry methods. Indeed, if we are to escape from what Richard House (1997) calls the “sterile and soul-less empiricism” of much of the conventional approaches to counselling research, then research methods that hold the same values as our practice need to be found. For this paper I have three objectives. Firstly, I want to explore what really is the problem, the problem for us as counsellors who want to engage in research. Secondly, I want to make an argument around what I mean by participatory. To do this I will outline a pluralistic model for research practice, which rejects the simplistic distinction between quantitative and qualitative inquiry, and emphasises the importance of clarifying the paradigm assumptions and the logic of inquiry entailed in our research methods. A crucial feature of this model is the proposal for a third paradigm of knowing, called *the participatory*, which stresses *mind-in-participation-with-*, and reflects the “participatory turn” now taking place in the human and social sciences. Thirdly, I will review and discuss a range of participatory inquiry methods, including Heuristic Inquiry, Co-operative Inquiry, Autoethnography, Mindful Inquiry, together with narrative, phenomenological, transpersonal and action research methods.

Starting from (sow)here

“We know the world only through our relationship to it.”

M. Scott Peck (1978, *The Road Less Travelled*, p.51)

My idea is that we need to think about somewhere that we can start from, and I have decided to start from here, with this quote from Scott Peck – *we know our world only through our relationship to it* – i.e. through our *participation* in it. And, it is on this notion of participation that I want to focus. My claim is that human life is inherently participatory, and that human experience is always participatory. A stronger claim, and one that I do not have the time to develop further here, is that the human ego is primarily a participatory structure, and that the outcome of our ego participations is the construction of meaning.

Moreover, I would claim that spiritual experience can be defined as arising from a profound participation in life, and that counselling practice is inherently a participatory activity.

The question that then arises is: “*Why aren’t our research methods participatory?!??*”

Perhaps it would be useful to go back over the original ideas of what counselling practice is concerned with, and I think we cannot do any better than going back to the *first* book about counselling, and still possibly the best book in my opinion, in which Rollo May (1939) poses the key question “*What is a human being?*”

My point is that, although each of us may have (slightly) different answers to this question, this is not really the problem. But a problem does arise when we forget this question, when we marginalize it. In considering this question, the point I wish to emphasize is that one of the original insights of counselling is that human life is *participatory*, and therefore the practice of counselling needs to be participatory, as does our research.

Counselling Research: The nature of the problem

Some ten years ago, Richard House (1997; p. 201) made the following point on the inappropriateness of the conventional empiricist approach to counselling research:-

“Anyone of the humanistic persuasion who is familiar with the empirical research literature in any of the social sciences (including many branches of the psychology discipline) can only surely wince at the aridity and disembodied irrelevance of a significant proportion of the conventional literature in the academic journals: and I submit that it would be a tragedy if our field, based as it is on person-centred, holistic values, were to go down the same road of sterile and soul-less empiricism.”

For several years now, I have taken particular enjoyment in reading out this quote to various groups of counsellors in training, as it reflects so well my own concerns with the “disembodied irrelevance” of so much research. While remaining fully committed to the need for an evidence-based counselling practice, I also have found that so many of the “sterile and soul-less” methods of inquiry seem to be in complete denial of the *reflection-based practice* that I am grounded in.

Research as Disciplined Inquiry

Having defined the problem, the question becomes: how do we begin to tackle it? Well, some 15 or so years ago, in trying to apply discourse analysis techniques to the analysis of interview data, I became aware that the theoretical assumptions of the methods that I was using in this research were very much opposed to my personal perspective of “what is a human being?” Discourse analysis relies upon a constructionist perspective, which emphasises the socio-linguistic environment in which human situated and occasioned actions take place. While I see this as possibly the best perspective we have on the nature of our socio-cultural environment, it does seem to have very little room at all for constructs of human consciousness, lived experience, the self, etc, etc. It seemed to me that these discursive tools simply were incompatible with my *practice paradigm*. Moreover, if I was to teach research methods to trainee counsellors and therapists, then I had a problem.




Figure 1: A Model of Disciplined Inquiry (Hiles, 2006)

A significant breakthrough for me was when I came across a chapter by Guba & Lincoln (1994) in the then recently published *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Crucially they offered a notion of *inquiry paradigms* – which focused on the underlying *ontological*, *epistemological* and *methodological* assumptions at play in our research methods. Later, prompted by Heron & Reason (1997) they added the fourth dimension of *axiology* (see Lincoln & Guba, 2000) to their scheme. This notion of *paradigm* is at work throughout the natural, social and human sciences. Guba & Lincoln (1994) propose that: “. . . a paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs [or assumptions] that deals with ultimates or first principles” (p. 107), and they point out that a *paradigm* is: “. . . not open to proof in any conventional sense” (p. 108).

Cutting a rather long story very short, I tried to reconcile Guba & Lincoln’s position with a phenomenological / transpersonal paradigm (Hiles, 1999). I was trying to clarify especially the paradigm assumptions for research concerned with everyday human knowing, lived experience (including spiritual experience), narrative, learning, personal growth, etc.

Taking up a term used in educational research, which also is used by Braud & Anderson (1998), I began to develop a pluralistic model of a wide range of research practice, that I called *Disciplined Inquiry* (see Figure 1).

First, I will just briefly outline some of the main features of this model. A key feature of the model is the rejection of the over-simplistic distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods. I argue that we are not going to get very far if we simply focus upon the type of data that we collect. Instead we need to focus upon differences in the logic of inquiry. Indeed, we need to wake up to the different logics of inquiry that we can use. I propose at least three: (i) *theory driven* (e.g. hypothesis testing), (ii) *data driven* (e.g. grounded theory), and (iii) *explanation driven* inquiry (Hiles, 2006a, 2006b).

Other major features of this model include: five overlapping phases of research; an emphasis on *strategies* of research which offer the crucial link between paradigm assumptions and methods (this particularly draws attention to the *research question* and *logic(s) of inquiry*); the pluralistic approach to the logic, paradigm, and data analysis; together with a full *transparency* of the assumptions, choices and methods employed (Hiles, 2008).

But perhaps the most radical feature of all is the proposal for three fundamental paradigms of knowing: *positivist*, *constructionist* and *participatory*. In their original paper, Guba & Lincoln proposed four basic paradigms, but what I propose is that we collapse these to just two, and then add a third. Without losing the historical and practical issues involved, it seems to me that positivism and post-positivism can be grouped under the common heading of *positivist*, and critical theory and constructivism under the heading *constructionist*. The need for the addition of a third fundamental paradigm of knowing then becomes more and more obvious. What seems to be missing is a paradigm that acknowledges the fundamental place that lived experience occupies in human knowing, something that Heron & Reason (1997) call *participative*, and that I am calling *participatory*. So, in this way I tried to simplify matters by defining three fundamental underlying paradigms.

The Participatory Turn

What I am drawing attention to is what could be called a “*participatory turn*” that is taking place in the human/social sciences. I have argued elsewhere that human psychology makes very little sense without the notion of *participatory knowing*, and that counselling and

Table 1: A Selection of the Participatory Literature

- *Ancient tradition*
- Blaise Pascal (1670) (*esprit de finesse*)
- Friedrich Nietzsche (1882) (*earth; spirit/body*)
- Edmund Husserl (1913) (*phenomenology*)
- Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) (*dwelling; readiness-to-hand*)
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) (*embodiment*)
- Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) (*meaning as practice*)
- Paul Tillich (1955) (*participation and knowledge*)
- Michael Polanyi (1958) (*indwelling; participative realism*)
- Marjorie Grene (1966) (*the knower and the known*)
- Hubert Dreyfus (1972) (*coping, development of a practice*)
- J. J. Gibson (1976) (*affordances*)
- Morris Berman (1981) (*participatory consciousness*)
- John Searle (1983) (*background of know-how, intentionality*)
- William Poteat (1985) (“*mindbodily grounded in the world*”)

Table 1: cont./

- Donald Polkinghorne (1988) (*narrative knowing*)
- Charles Taylor (1989) (*radical reflexivity*)
- Clark Moustakas (1990) (*heuristic inquiry*)
- Francisco Varela (1993) (*enactive knowing, embodied mind*)
- Henryk Skolimowski (1994) (*the participatory mind*)
- John Heron (1996; 1998; 2006) (*participative reality*)
- Heron & Reason (1997) (*participatory inquiry paradigm*)
- Braud & Anderson (1998) (*transpersonal inquiry*)
- John Shotter (2000) (*participatory stance*)
- Peter Reason (2001) (*participatory world view*)
- Paul Dourish (2001) (*computers and embodied interaction*)
- Jorge Ferrer (2002) (*transpersonal participatory vision*)
- Miller & Crabtree (2005) (*slow knowledge – wheel of inquiry*)
- Hiles (2005, 2006a, b, 2007a, 2008a, b) (*participatory knowing*)
- Evan Thompson (2007) (*embodied dynamicism*)

psychotherapy are entirely premised on this idea (Hiles, 2008d). Moreover, my position is explicitly pluralistic, it is crucial that we recognize that human beings act on the basis of all three types of knowing.

What I am calling the participatory turn isn't very recent at all. Its origins go back to ancient tradition, and is at the centre of much of Eastern philosophy. In Western thought it can be traced through the writings of Pascal and Nietzsche, and is clearly central to a non-dualistic position that emerges from the work of Husserl and Heidegger, and has been gathering momentum ever since. Table 1 sketches out the emergence and progress of this turn. Here, I will just briefly outline the key contributions of John Heron, Michael Polanyi and Martin Heidegger to the growing participatory literature.

John Heron

One person who has made perhaps the most recent significant contribution to a participatory turn is John Heron with his development of co-operative inquiry methodology. Heron (1996) proposes an approach to human inquiry that explicitly stresses a participative paradigm which:

“ . . . holds that there is a given cosmos in which the mind participates . . . we know through this active participation of mind that we are in touch with what is other . . . reality is always subjective-objective: our own constructs clothe a felt participation in what is present ” (p. 10-11).

“Our lived world is participative: the perceiver is part of the perceived and vice versa . . . The relation of participation between perceiver and the perceived is always transient, partial, perspectival, incomplete and changing ” (p. 186).

“You can't inquire into the human condition from outside it . . . you can't get outside it . . . even if you could . . . you would have to get back into it in order to study it” (p. 200).

Michael Polanyi

Another significant contribution to the participatory turn comes from the Hungarian scientist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi. He is responsible for what is best described as a radical challenge to “normal science.” His proposal is that *personal knowledge* (Polanyi, 1958) plays a vital and inescapable role in all scientific research, indeed, in all human knowing.

“Let us therefore do something quite radical . . . let us incorporate into our conception of scientific knowledge the part which we ourselves necessarily contribute in shaping such knowledge” (Polanyi, 1975, 28-9).

By stressing the *tacit* nature of participatory knowing, Polanyi is claiming that “*we know more than we can tell.*” In this way he is pointing out knowledge that is implicit to a task (e.g. know-how, skill), to a situation (e.g. travelling, interviewing, cooking), to a perspective (e.g. points of view, beliefs), etc.

Polanyi here is offering a *participative realism* (see Mullins, 1997), a non-dualistic position that is not very different from the re-current theme that runs through the earlier work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, as well as most Eastern Philosophy (Hiles, 2008c).

Martin Heidegger

And the third person I want to highlight with respect to this participatory turn, who could be argued to be the most important of all, is Martin Heidegger. It is my view, that outside of Continental philosophy, the work of Martin Heidegger has been marginalized for far too long. In setting out his philosophy of being-in-the-world, he crucially distinguishes between the *present-at-hand* and the *ready-to-hand* (Heidegger, 1927). The present-to-hand, more or less, corresponds to positivist knowledge, whereas the ready-to-hand is characterized as:

“ . . . the kind of dealing which is closest to us, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of ‘knowledge’ ” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 95).

Heidegger here stresses the *primacy* of the readiness-to-hand, with its own kind of knowing. First and foremost we relate to the world in terms of what is meaningful, what matters to us. Heidegger argues that our scientific theorizing of the world is secondary, and derivative.

Heidegger is offering an ontology that is far broader than the dualistic Cartesian framework. It is an ontology that I have argued fits far more comfortably with much of psychology and especially counselling practice (Hiles, 2008c, 2008d).

It follows from Heidegger’s perspective that human action is *embodied*, that human knowing is *enactive*, and that human subjectivity is *participatory*. I believe that what I am calling the *participatory* corresponds precisely to Heidegger’s notion of “*readiness-to-hand.*”

This idea is explored further in Table 2. Positivist knowing is concerned with our getting about in the world, with understanding that world. Participatory knowing is concerned with what we gain through first-hand experience. However, I include a third kind of knowing

Table 2: Three paradigms of knowing (cf. Hiles, 2005, 2007a, 2008d)

<p>Positivist Knowledge (<i>present-at-hand*</i>)</p>	<p>Getting about in “the world”, measurement, size, weight, shape, design, manufacture, cause-effect, “<u>fit</u>-for-purpose”, etc</p>
<p>Cultural/Social Construction (<i>arbitrary-in-hand</i>)</p>	<p>Cultural discourses and practices, social and cultural artifice, differences, customs, folklore, histories; stories of value, meaning, availability, preservation, etc</p>
<p>Participatory Knowing (<i>readiness-to-hand*</i>)</p>	<p>First-hand experience, familiarity; tacit know-how, knack, skill, expertise; practical uses, affordance, “learning on the job”, concern, purpose, possibility, adaptability, improvisation; choice, preferences, fascination, absorption; acquisition; care, maintenance, etc</p>

* - Heidegger’s terminology

which I characterize as *arbitrary-in-hand*, concerned with language, with conventions and rules, with cultural and discursive practices, etc. My point is that in thinking about, *what is a human being?*, we need to consider all three types of knowing. Yet we have consistently played down, and even ignored, the participatory in our modern thinking. The field of epistemology has been strangely silent on the topic, as well. My own emphasis is upon exploring methods of inquiry that can focus on *mind-in-participation-with* . . .

The phenomenological imperative

There is one final consideration that I also need to mention. I want to stress what I call the phenomenological imperative, i.e. that we must realise that *experience needs to be studied for itself*.

What I mean by this is that human experience needs to be taken at face value – i.e. as proposed by Husserl (1913), it can be studied without direct reference to whatever “reality” that gives rise to it (this is what Husserl calls *bracketing*). As Ferrer (2000) points out, far too often experience is taken as *of* something, and this leads to a dualistic perspective. We are concerned then with what can be regarded as a *radical empiricism* – i.e. all knowledge begins first with experience. And, the point is that this gives primacy to the *participatory*.

Participatory Inquiry

What then are the implications of recognizing this third paradigm? What are the possibilities of applying the participatory paradigm for human inquiry to counselling research methods. You may not be aware, but there is a growing interest in participatory inquiry, and what I want to do in the third part of this paper is review some of these already existing participatory methods. To begin with let’s divide these into roughly three types of participatory inquiry (as can be seen in Table 3), then we will examine each in turn. The inclusion of ancient methods of inquiry, is an acknowledgment that participatory methods were probably the basis for the original scientific method, i.e. of systematic inquiry, much

Table 3: Methods of Participatory Inquiry

Ancient methods of inquiry

Explicit methods (*Researcher oriented*)

Heuristic Inquiry (Clark Moustakas)

Co-operative / Lived Inquiry (John Heron)

Autoethnography (Carolyn Ellis)

Mindful Inquiry (Valerie Bentz & Jeremy Shapiro)

Implicit methods (*Participant oriented*)

Narrative Inquiry (Hiles & Čermák)

Phenomenological Inquiry (Donald Polkinghorne, etc)

Transpersonal Inquiry (Braud & Anderson)

Action Research /Participative Inquiry (Peter Reason)

later to be overtaken, but not completely replaced, by positivistic experimental methods. Referring to “explicit methods,” I am thinking of what might be better called researcher oriented methods, where it is the researcher’s own participative experience which is the explicit focus of inquiry. And, by “implicit methods” I am referring to inquiry methods where the participatory knowing of research participants is the focus of inquiry. We will begin with the explicit methods.

Heuristic Inquiry

This approach to research was developed by Clark Moustakas (1990), and explicitly emphasizes the participatory role of the researcher in the research process. It is in fact a form of systematic and rigorous reflexivity. Moustakas points out that:

“Heuristic research is a demanding process . . . in heuristic research the investigator must have had a direct, personal encounter with the phenomenon being investigated” (p. 14).

The demanding nature of this approach to research should not be underestimated. However, there are important parallels between this method of inquiry and counselling/therapy practice, e.g. Moustakas cites Barrineau & Bozarth (1989) as follows:

“. . . the difference between therapy and heuristic research of the person-centered model is a moot one,” and *“. . . the heuristic process requires direct and active participation of the therapist . . . Such participation involves special moments of self-awareness and an openness to metaphysical forms of knowing”* (p. 105).

Table 4: Moustakas’ conceptual framework

Identify with the focus of the inquiry
Self dialogue
Tacit knowing
Intuition
Indwelling
Focusing
Internal frame of reference

With respect to heuristic inquiry, Moustakas stresses the focus on the researcher's own participatory experience, such that:

“ . . . *the self of the researcher is present throughout the process*” (p. 9), and “ . . . *from the beginning, and throughout an investigation, heuristic research involves self-search, self-dialogue, and self-discovery*” (p. 11).

Moustakas provides a conceptual framework for Heuristic Inquiry that is summarized in Table 4. I have time to just highlight two of these concepts – *tacit knowing* and *indwelling*.

Tacit knowing

The influence of the ideas of Michael Polanyi on Moustakas should not be underestimated. The tacit dimension was “ . . . *Polanyi's significant contribution to humanistic science*” (Douglass & Moustakas, 1985, p. 49).

Polanyi regarded the enlightenment belief in “scientific detachment” as having produced a crisis in scientific method. Moustakas takes up Polanyi's argument that all claims to objective scientific knowledge involve a reliance upon personal (i.e. *tacit*) knowledge:

“*Underlying all other concepts in heuristic research, at the base of all heuristic discovery, is the power of revelation in tacit knowing*” (Moustakas, 1990, p. 20).

The seven phases of heuristic inquiry are set out in Table 5. I want to stress that Moustakas clearly sets out seven phases, and not six as some have claimed. The seventh phase of “validation” must not be overlooked. Also, in Table 5, I have indicated the connection with Polanyi's (1958) basic four phases of scientific inquiry. Moustakas is simply offering a refinement of Polanyi's original ideas.

Indwelling

Indwelling (which I prefer to call *discernment*), is another key term taken straight from Polanyi. It is a concept that is especially important in the development of the skill of reflexivity, e.g. qualitative analysis can be viewed as a process involving the systematic and rigorous application of indwelling. This is particularly important in at least three ways (see Hiles, 2008a):

- (i) indwelling especially stresses the participatory nature of tacit knowing,
- (ii) indwelling is crucially involved in the sifting through and interpretation of qualitative data,
- (iii) indwelling seems to offer the possibility of a specific methodological tool within qualitative research, and is especially relevant to *reflexivity*.

Heuristic inquiry offers probably the fundamental approach to participatory inquiry.

Table 5: Phases of heuristic inquiry
(for further discussion, see Hiles, 2008a)

Initial engagement (*preparation 1)

Immersion (*preparation 2)

Incubation (*incubation)

Illumination (*illumination)

Explication (*verification 1)

Creative synthesis (*verification 2)

Validation (*verification 3)

* - Polanyi's equivalent terminology

Co-operative Inquiry

Co-operative inquiry is Heron's basic research tool for a *participatory inquiry paradigm*.

"In co-operative inquiry the exclusive roles [. . . of researcher and subject] are replaced by a co-operative relationship of bilateral initiative and control, so that all those involved work together as co-researchers and as co-subjects". . . "This is not research on people, but research with people" (Heron, 1998, p. 234).

"Co-operative inquiry . . . involves two or more people researching a topic through their experience of it, using a series of cycles in which they move between this experience and reflecting together on it" (Heron, 1998, p. 235).

This participatory approach to research, adapts the *action research model*, involving repeated cycling through four steps:

Step 1: Agreeing, planning and devising a focus of inquiry

Step 2: *Action phase* – observing and recording experiences

Step 3: *Reflection* – immersion engagement with experience

Step 4: *Evaluation* – sharing, reframing, validating, for the next cycle.

It can be seen that co-operative inquiry shares precisely the same paradigm assumptions with heuristic inquiry, but is more oriented towards group research, and can be more time-limited (less open-ended).

Autoethnography

Ethnography is the study of human action and experience within its socio/cultural or group context, usually involving field research. *Autoethnography* is the inclusion of the personal and autobiographical within this approach, such that the lived experience of the researcher becomes a key part of the study (Ellis, 2004). This is similar to heuristic inquiry, but with an emphasis on participation within its socio/cultural context. Autoethnographies can range from simple reflexive narrative accounts to personal narratives saturated with the insights from extended researcher self inquiry.

Mindful Inquiry

Another method that needs to be included has been proposed by Bentz & Shapiro (1998), who have outlined an interesting variation of participatory inquiry which they call *mindful inquiry* (see Figure 2). This draws upon four knowledge traditions. They stress putting the person at the centre of inquiry, so that: *" . . . awareness of self and reality and their interaction is a positive value in itself and should be present in research processes" (p. 6).*




Figure 2: Mindful inquiry

Narrative Inquiry

Moving on now to implicit methods, where the focus is upon specific methods for collecting and analyzing participatory data, we will start with narrative inquiry.




Figure 3: The model of Narrative Oriented Inquiry (NOI) (Hiles & Čermák, 2008)

It would be useful to first spell out three things that will help us understand the fundamental nature of narrative, as well as its relevance to counselling and psychotherapy research (Hiles, Čermák & Chrz, 2009):

- (1) Narratives are a dominant form of human discourse, i.e. social and cultural practices for the circulation of meanings;
- (2) Narratives do not simply relate events, they highlight a human perspective and interpretation on those events, i.e. what *matters* to us (I like to think of stories as “*matterings*”);

(3) As Paul Ricoeur (1987) points out this reflects an implicit *narrative intelligence*, and I would emphasize, an intelligence that is foundational to our participatory knowing.

It is in the second and third of these where my own research interests lie, and these are especially relevant to counselling practice. In this respect, I have developed a model of *Narrative Oriented Inquiry* (NOI) with my colleague Ivo Čermák (see Figure 3).

We describe NOI as a methodological approach, a dynamic model for good practice (see Hiles & Čermák, 2008; Hiles, Čermák & Chrz, 2009 for further details). Starting with a narrative approach to interviewing, a working transcript is produced, so that the narrative structure can be analysed. For the example given in Tables 6 and 7 below, NK's narrative has been broken down, first into segments, then the *sjuzet* and *fabula* are identified (roughly, the *sjuzet* is the *telling*, and *fabula* is the *told* – we underline the *sjuzet*), and analytical comments are listed in the right-hand margin. (Note that the *fabula* when read by itself, reads as a rather “flat” story). The outcome of this analysis identifies three *fabulas*, and five *identity positions* that NK constructs for himself.

Table 6: NK's Story (*NOI Analysis*)

<p>NOI Example 1: (NK – “On me own”)</p> <p>1 <u>I remember one particular incident.</u></p> <p>2 <u>My father died in nineteen . . . seventy, seventy seven.</u> <u>My mother died in . . . sixty seven.</u></p> <p>3 <u>Um, when</u> me mother died, I went up to the funeral on my own.</p> <p>4 <u>We were hard up at the time, we had only just been up there because we heard she was dying, and she lived another fortnight after that, and we'd been up as a family, and quite frankly we couldn't afford to go up there as a family again.</u></p> <p>5 <u>So I went up for the funeral on me own.</u></p> <p>6 <u>That meant that when</u> we came to the graveside . . . there was me two brothers with their wives, and me sister with her husband, and my father, and I was on me own in a way.</p> <p>7 <u>Um, I remember</u> standing at the graveside, putting my hand on me dad's shoulder, and he shrugged me off.</p> <p>8 I was very hurt <u>by that, um, but you know, being a tough guy,</u> I got to smother those feelings. <u>But I did feel quite rejected and very much alone. . . uh . . . and still it stresses me to think about it now.</u></p>	<p>Comments:</p> <p>Abstract* <i>remembering!</i></p> <p>●Fab1 [<i>start of fabula</i>] <u>IP-1</u> <i>[explanation-flashback!]</i></p> <p><i>[rep./recap!]</i></p> <p>Setting</p> <p>Complication <i>[rejected]</i></p> <p>Eval. <u>IP-2</u> Result <i>[he coped]</i> Coda <i>still</i> <i>now</i> <u>IP-3</u></p>
---	---

Coding Notation:

I remember . . . – Sjuzet is underlined

* - Labov & Waletzky (Abstract, Setting, Complication, Evaluation, Result, Coda)

[. . !] – comment

●**Fab1** – Fabula 1, etc.

he stood . . . – highlighting of word/phrse that functions as both sjuzet and fabula

IP-1 – Identity Position 1, etc.

Key:

IP-1 – being alone

IP-2 – being hurt

IP-4 – being helped

IP-5 – being loved by my father

Table 7: NK's Story (*NOI Analysis Cont./*)**NOI Example 2: (NK – “a terrace of a hundred houses”)**

[. . *being helped by name* . .]

10 [. . and he helped me to look at times when my father had actually shown his love for me.] . . .

15 [. .] And I looked at times when my father had, when I went in the army for instance, he stood outside in the rain, it was drizzling with rain.

16 We lived in a street with a hundred houses, we lived at number four, and in order to get to the main road to get to the bus stop, we had to walk right up the hundred houses.

17 A terrace of a hundred houses.

18 I walked all the way, and kept turning round, and my dad kept waving to me.

19 And it was things like that that helped me to feel that my father did love me.

20 He was dead then, so I couldn't do very much. It was one, it was one, that I could feel good about it again. And I was helped a lot by that

Comments:

}

} **IP-4**

} ↑●**Fab2**

}

} rain [*the rain!!*]

} ↑Abstract-Fab3

} ●**Fab3**

Setting

[*explanation*]

[*rep/refrain!*]

}

} Compl.

} Eval./Result **IP-5**

[*nar. reframing*]

} Coda-Fab2

IP-4

[*Fab3??*]

The research question for this study was “*how do people become involved in the kind of voluntary work that they do?*” The two extracts are taken from the middle of the interview, and are in response to the question: “*Is there anything in your own life, a difficult period that you feel you got through yourself, that helps you to offer help to other people?*” NK is a counsellor, and it is my view that these extracts come very close to how people talk about themselves in a therapeutic context, but I stress this is not counselling as such.

The analysis shown above draws upon the ideas of a number of other researchers. The separation into *sjuzet* and *fabula* is critical from our perspective, and was developed out of Herman & Vervaeck's (2001) notion of a distinction between the *unbounded* and *bounded* parts of the text (Hiles, 2007b). Using Labov & Waletzky (1967) we can identify the underlying structure of the interlinked stories being told (*Fab1*, *Fab2* & *Fab3* – n.b. *Fab2* has been omitted from presentation here). An observation that I especially find interesting is the role of the *sjuzet* (the particular way in which the stories are being told) in constructing the *evaluative function* of each *fabula*. We characterize these narrative evaluations as *identity positions*, where NK positions himself in relation to the events he is giving an account of, i.e. NK constructs, for himself, a view of himself in relation to these events. NK *participates* in his own construction of self. The output of such an analysis can then be fed into a series of approaches suggested by Lieblich et al (1998) and Emerson & Frosh (2004) in order to analyze the processes of construction of narrative identity further.

This example highlights NK's *participatory construction of self*. It offers a formal representation of what the counsellor/therapist needs to do in *listening to the client*.

Phenomenological Inquiry

There are a number of different approaches to phenomenological inquiry (see Giorgi, 1985; Moustakas, 1994) that obviously fit with a participatory approach, and here Donald Polkinghorne characterizes the participatory emphasis in the notion of a *meeting of person and world*:

“Because the descriptions of natural objects are derived from experience, experience itself must be clearly understood before a firm foundation can be established for the sciences of the natural world . . . the phenomenological map refocuses inquiry, concentrating not on descriptions of worldly objects but on descriptions of experience . . . The form and continuity of experience are products of an intrinsic relationship between human beings and the world . . . Experience as it is directly given, occurs at the meeting of person and world” Polkinghorne, (1989, p. 41-2).

However, phenomenological inquiry raises several key issues, here are just three:

- (1) There is a need to clearly distinguish psychological from philosophical inquiry.
- (2) The strict nature of the RQ and interviewing format must be recognized – it makes very little sense to collect interview data and then subject it to a phenomenological analysis - phenomenological inquiry is a methodological approach.
- (3) There are a number of different approaches to analysis: (i) descriptive vs. (ii) interpretative. Giorgi & Giorgi (2008) have recently pointed out how these different approaches stem from different positions within phenomenology itself, and may be currently difficult to reconcile.

Transpersonal Inquiry

Research that acknowledges the spiritual dimension of human experience has begun to develop a range of research methods of its own, all of which stress a participatory approach. Five of these transpersonal approaches to research have been set out by Braud & Anderson (1998), and are summarized below:

Table 6: Five approaches to transpersonal inquiry

1. **Integral inquiry** (*William Braud*) – focus on an experience with great meaning recognizing its multileveled, complex, transformative nature
2. **Intuitive inquiry** (*Rosemarie Anderson*) – exploring experience that is complex and subtle, stressing intuition and altered states of consciousness
3. **Organic research** (*Jennifer Clements*) – focus on participants' own stories, using the participants' own voices and words
4. **Transpersonal-Phenomenological inquiry** (*Ron Valle*) – stressing transpersonal awareness is prior to prereflective structures
5. **Inquiry informed by exceptional human experiences** (*Rhea White*) – accessing other ways of knowing, realities, transformation

Action Research / Participative Inquiry

There has been a re-branding, or re-marketing of action research as participative inquiry which is particularly evident in the work of Peter Reason (1994). The following quotes are taken from the *Handbook of Action Research* (Reason & Bradbury, 2001):

“ . . . action research is a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a participatory worldview” (p. 1).

“ . . . action research is participative research, and all participative research must be action research” (p. 2).

“The emergent worldview has been described as systemic, holistic, relational, feminine, experiential, but its defining characteristic is that it is participatory: our world does not consist of separate things but of relationships which we co-author” (p. 6).

It is this notion of a participatory world view that lies at the core of what I have been calling a participatory paradigm. It is Peter Reason to whom I am particularly indebted for spelling this out so clearly. My own contribution has been in stressing the pluralistic nature of human knowing, within which the participatory has primacy, and how this is being finally acknowledged in the form of a participatory turn quietly manifesting in the human sciences.

Beyond Reflexivity

Lastly, I need to mention the notion of *reflexivity* which has recently received some dedicated attention (see Etherington, 2004). It is perhaps the case that nearly all of what I have been talking about so far could perhaps be subsumed under the notion of *reflexivity* in qualitative inquiry. However, what I have been focusing on is where reflexivity is seen to be the main focus of the research process, and not simply the backdrop, or an afterthought. Furthermore, we do need to note that reflexivity is not as yet a particularly systematic or rigorous practice.

My point is that reflexivity is essentially concerned with the participatory nature of inquiry, and the paradigm I have been talking about has enormous implications for defining, exploring and systematizing reflexivity in both our research and clinical practice. Moreover, as I hinted earlier, reflexivity needs to be approached as a heuristic process.

Counselling as Participatory Practice

I want to summarize by saying that my interest in all of these research methods has been motivated by my concern to improve my own, as well as other counselors, ability to *listen* to our clients. Indeed, a striking feature of the inquiry paradigm that I am offering is that it particularly echoes our therapeutic practices.

What I am sure of is that my own grasp of *listening* has been expanded by notions of *reflexivity*, and by treating therapy as a form of *action research*, and by *integral, intuitive* and *organic* transpersonal approaches. It is expanded by notions of *phenomenological sensitivity, narrative knowing* and *narrative intelligence*, and *identity positioning*; by *mindfulness*, by an *ethnographic* and *co-operative* perspective; and above all, by notions of *indwelling, discernment, tacit knowing* and *self dialogue*. Indeed, these are all foundational to the insights I rely upon in my own *heuristic, participatory practice*.

Conclusion

I began by exploring the idea that we only know this world through our relationship to it. I have claimed that all knowing involves a participation through indwelling i.e. *mind-in-participation-with-*. And that our counselling practices are inherently *participatory*. I have argued that we need *research methods* that are participatory. Indeed, in preparing this paper, I have begun to wonder whether every counsellor in training should undertake a heuristic inquiry, a co-operative inquiry, a narrative oriented inquiry, etc, etc!!!! i.e. *to raise their awareness for the development of their own clinical participatory practice*.

There is growing participatory literature, a participatory turn that is taking place which is consistent with a third paradigm of human knowing, and consistent with the thinking of major philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger, etc. There is already a widening range of participatory research methods that either explicitly or implicitly embrace the participatory. Above all else what we need in counselling research is a pluralistic perspective – pluralism of our ways of knowing, of our paradigms, of our logic of inquiry, of our methods of data collection and methods of data analysis, but a pluralism that must also recognise the primacy of the *participatory*.

References

- Barrineau, P. & Bozarth, J.D. (1989) A person-centred research model. *Person-Centered Review*, 4, 465-474.
- Bentz, V. & Shapiro, J. (1998) *Mindful Inquiry in Social research*. London: Sage.
- Berman, M. (1981) *The Reenchantment of the World*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Braud, W. & Anderson, R. (1998) *Transpersonal Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. London: Sage.
- Douglass, B. & Moustakas, C. (1985) Heuristic inquiry: The internal search to know. *J. Humanistic Psychology*, 25, 39-55.
- Dourish, P. (2001) *Where the Action Is: The foundations of embodied interaction*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Dreyfus, H. (1972) *What Computers Can't Do*. NY: Harper & Row.
- Ellis, C. (2004) *The Ethnographic I: A methodological novel about ethnography*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira.
- Emerson, P. & Frosh, S. (2004) *Critical Narrative Analysis in Psychology*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Etherington, K. (2004) *Becoming a Reflexive Researcher*. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- Ferrer, J. (2000) Transpersonal knowledge: A participatory approach to transpersonal phenomena. Chap 10 in T. Hart et al, *Transpersonal Knowing: Exploring horizons of consciousness*. Albany, NY: SUNY.
- Ferrer, J. (2002) *Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A participatory vision of human spirituality*. Albany, NY: SUNY.
- Gibson, J.J. (1979) *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Houghton Mifflin.
- Giorgi, A. (1985) *Phenomenological and Psychological Research*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
- Giorgi, A. & Giorgi, B. (2008) Phenomenological psychology. Chap 10 in C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers, *Handbook Qualitative Research in Psychology*. London: Sage.
- Grene, M. (1966) *The Knower and the Known*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994) Competing paradigms in qualitative research. Chap 6 in N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Heidegger, M.(1927) *Being and Time*. (Trans. J. Macquarrie, 1962). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Heron, J. (1996) *Co-operative Inquiry: Research into the human condition*. London: Sage.
- Heron, J. (1998) *Sacred Science: Person-centred inquiry into the spiritual and the subtle*. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.
- Heron, J. (2006) *Participatory Spirituality: A farewell to authoritarian religion*. Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press.
- Heron, J. & Reason, P. (1997) A participatory inquiry paradigm. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 3, 274-294.
- Hiles, D.R. (1999) *Paradigms Lost – Paradigms Regained*. Paper presented at 18th International Human Science Research Conference, Sheffield, UK.
- Hiles, D.R. (2005) *Participatory Knowing and the Human Sciences*. Paper presented at 24th International Human Science Research Conference, Bournemouth, UK.
- Hiles, D.R. (2006a) *Methodological Diversity and the Logic of Human Inquiry*. Paper presented at 25th International Human Science Research Conference, Pleasant Hill, California, USA.
- Hiles, D.R. (2006b) *The Logic of Human Inquiry: Epistemological and pluralistic issues*. Paper presented at 6th European Qualitative Research Conference in Health and Social Care, Bournemouth, UK.
- Hiles, D.R. (2007a) *Heidegger: Participatory action and everyday things*. Paper presented at 10th European Congress of Psychology, Prague, CZ.
- Hiles, D.R. (2007b) Identity Positioning: Narrative analysis of sjuzet and fabula. In D. Robinson, N. Kelly, and K. Milnes (Eds.) *Narrative and Memory*. Huddersfield: University of Huddersfield Press.
- Hiles, D.R. (2008a) Heuristic Inquiry. In L. Given (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods*. London: Sage.
- Hiles, D.R. (2008b) Transparency. In L. Given (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research Methods*. London: Sage.
- Hiles, D.R. (2008c) Putting *Heidegger Polanyi Popper* in the same frame. Paper presented at Polanyi Society Conference: "Personal Knowledge at Fifty." Loyola University, Chicago.
- Hiles, D.R. (2008d) *Heidegger and the Participatory Paradigm for Psychological Research*. Paper presented at International Conference in Critical Psychology (Subjectivity), Cardiff.
- Hiles, D.R. & Čermák, I. (2008) Narrative Psychology. Chap 9 in C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers, *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology*. London: Sage.
- Hiles, D.R., Čermák, I. & Chrz, V. (2009) Narrative Oriented Inquiry: A dynamic framework for good practice. In D. Robinson, et al.(Eds.) *Narrative and Memory*. Huddersfield: University of Huddersfield Press. (In press).
- House, R. (1997) The dynamics of professionalism: A personal view of counselling research. *Counselling*, 8(3), (Aug), 200-207.

- Husserl, E. (1913) *The Idea of Phenomenology*. (Trans. By Alston & Nakhnikian, 1964). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Labov, W. & Waletzky, J. (1967) Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience. In J. Helm (ed.) *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Lieblich, A., Tuval-Mashiach, R. & Zilber, T. (1998) *Narrative Research: Reading, analysis and interpretation*. London: Sage Publications.
- Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G. (2000) Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences. Chap 6 in N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (2nd Edition). London: Sage.
- May, R. (1939) *The Art of Counselling*. NY: Abingdon Press. (Revised Ed.: 1989 – Souvenir Press).
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945) *The Phenomenology of Perception*. (Trans. C. Smith, 1962). NY: Humanities Press.
- Miller, W.L. & Crabtree, B.F. (2005) Clinical research. Chap 24 in N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln, *Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (3rd Edition). Sage.
- Moustakas, C. (1990) *Heuristic Research: Design, methodology and applications*. London, Sage.
- Moustakas, C. (1994) *Phenomenological Research Methods*. London: Sage.
- Mullins, P. (1997) Polanyi's participative realism. *Polanyiana*, 6(2).
- Nietzsche, F. (1883) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. (Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, 1961). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Pascal, B. (1670) *Pensées*. (English translation: 1958) NY: Dutton & Co.
- Peck, M. Scott. (1978) *The Road Less Travelled*. Simon & Schuster.
- Polanyi, M. (1958) *Personal Knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Polanyi, M. (1975) (with H. Prosch) *Meaning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Polkinghorne, D. (1988) *Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences*. Albany: SUNY.
- Polkinghorne, D. (1989) Phenomenological research methods. Chap 3 in R. Valle, *Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives*. NY: Plenum.
- Poteat, W.H. (1985) *Polanyian Meditations: In search of a post-critical logic*. Durham, PA: Duke University Press.
- Reason, P. & Bradbury, H. (2001) *Handbook of Action Research*. London: Sage.
- Ricoeur, P. (1987) Life: A story in search of a narrator. (In M.J. Valdés, 1991, *A Ricoeur Reader*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf)
- Searle, J. (1983) *Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shotter, J. (2000) From within our lives together: Wittgenstein, Bakhtin and Voloshinov and the shift to a participatory stance in understanding understanding. Chap 7 in L. Holzman & J. Morss, *Postmodern Psychologies, Societal Practice, and Political Life*. London: Routledge
- Skolimowski, H. (1994) *The Participatory Mind*. London, Arkana.
- Taylor, C. (1989) *Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, E. (2007) *Mind in Life: Biology, phenomenology and the sciences of mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tillich, P. (1955) Participation and knowledge: Problems of an ontology of cognition. In *Sociologica. Max Horkheimer zum 60. Geburtstag*, Hrsg. V. W. Adorno und W. Dirks, Frankfurt a. M. Europaeische Verlagsanstalt 1955. S. 201-209.
- Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1993) *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive science and human experience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.